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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
,

Do unmarried cohabiting couples fall outside the scope
of the Fair Employment and Housing Act's protection from housing
discrimination on the basis of marital status?
1

2.
If the Fair Employment and Housing Act's protections
apply to unmarried cohabiting couples, should the strict scrutiny
test be utilized to determine whether Mrs. Smith's
constitutionally protected religious beliefs exempt her from the
Act?
3
Does the state have any compelling interest to justify
the severe infringement that the Fair Employment and Housing Act
and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission's order place on
Mrs. Smith's state and federal free exercise rights?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EVELYN SMITH,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

V.

)

)

FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, )
)

Defendant and Respondent,

)
)

KENNETH C. PHILLIPS, et al.,

)
)

Real Parties in Interest.

)

_________)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

On Appeal From a Decision by the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission
Review Following Writ of Mandate and Decision of the
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Kenneth Phillips and Gail Randall ("Real Parties in
Interest") filed identical written complaints with the Department
of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging that Mrs. Evelyn
Smith ("Respondent") violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12955, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act
by committing an act of housing discrimination.

1

(C.T. 2.)

Phillips and Randall alleged they were denied rental access to
Mrs. Smith’s one bedroom apartment because of their status as an
unmarried cohabiting couple.

(C.T. 2.)

Based on Phillips

complaint, the DFEH issued two accusations against Mrs. Smith
claiming violations of the FEHA.

liL.

On April 25 and 26, 1988, an administrative hearing was
held.

(C.T. 2.)

However, the Commission decided not to adopt

the administrative law judge’s proposed decision.

Instead,

in a decision dated August 17, 1989, the Commission found that
Mrs. Smith had violated the FEHA by denying rental access to
Phillips on the basis of his marital status.
result, the Commission ordered Mrs. Smith to:

(C.T. 10.)

As a

(1) cease and

desist discriminating against potential tenants on the basis of
their marital status;

(2) pay out of pocket and emotional

distress damages totaling $952;

(3) post a notice for ninety days

that she violated the FEHA by refusing to rent to unmarried
couples;

(4) permanently post notice in her rental units of

renters' rights and remedies under the FEHA;

(5) sign the

notices; and (6) provide copies of the notices to all potential
tenants.

(C.T. 14.)

Mrs. Smith petitioned the Butte County Superior Court for a
writ of mandate to compel the Commission to set aside its
decision.

(C.T. 19.)

The Third District Court of Appeal issued

an alternative writ to decide the constitutionality of the FEHA
as applied to landlords whose religious beliefs forbid them from
renting to unmarried cohabiting couples.

(C.T. 38.)

The Third Appellate District for the Court of Appeal held
that the Commission's order violated Mrs. Smith's federal and

2

state constitutional rights.

Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous.

CoTtim'n. 30 Cal. App, 4th 1008, 1014 (1994).
petitioned for rehearing.

(C.T. 58.)

The Commission

The Court of Appeal made

minor modifications to its decision which did not alter the
judgment, and the Commission’s petition was denied.

(C.T. 60.)

The Commission petitioned this Court for review on July 1, 1994,
(C.T. 62), and this Court granted review on September 8, 1994.
(C.T. 64.)
Statement of Facts
Evelyn Smith owns and leases four rental units located in
Chico, California.

(C.T. 2.)

Mrs. Smith is a devout Christian,

and has been a member of the Bidwell Presbyterian Church for
approximately twenty-five years.

(C.T. 3.)

Mrs. Smith believes

that it is sinful to have sex outside of marriage, and that it
would be a sin for her to rent her units to people who will
engage in non-marital sex on her property.

Id.

Mrs. Smith also

believes that if she permits people to engage in non-marital sex
in her rental units, God will judge her and prevent her from
meeting her deceased husband in heaven.

Id.

Mrs. Smith advertised the availability of one of her units
in the Chico Enterprise Record during March and April of 1987.
(C.T. 3.)

In response to the advertisement, Kenneth Phillips and

Gail Randall called Mrs. Smith to arrange to see the unit.

liL.

During this phone conversation, Mrs. Smith informed them that she
preferred to rent to married couples.

Id.

Phillips falsely

represented to Mrs. Smith that he was married to Randall.

14^

On or about April 7, 1987, Randall and Phillips executed a
lease agreement with Mrs. Smith for a month-to-month tenancy.

3

(C.T. 4.)
Id.

Randall signed the lease agreement "Gail Phillips."

Randall and Phillips paid Mrs. Smith a security deposit of

one hundred and fifty dollars.

liL.

Later that day, Phillips

called Mrs. Smith and informed her that he and Randall were not
married.

Id.

Mrs. Smith told him that she could not rent to an

unmarried cohabiting couple because it would violate her
religious beliefs, and subsequently refunded the security
deposit.

Id.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
California Government Code section 12955, the Fair
Employment and Housing Act, does not protect unmarried cohabiting
couples from housing discrimination.

The legislative history

indicates that the Act was designed to protect classes of persons
such as widows, divorcees, and single women with children,
communal living situations, and homosexuals.

Further, prior

decisions of California Courts of Appeal which held that marital
status protects unmarried cohcd)iting couples did not specifically
decide the status issue, and are factually distinguishable from
our case.
If this Court decides that unmarried cohabiting couples are
protected by the FEHA, the compelling state interest test is the
proper method for analyzing Mrs. Smith's free exercise
infringement claims.

This Court may decide this case on

independent state constitutional grounds alone, and thus apply
the compelling state interest test, as this Court always has, to
Mrs. Smith's claims.

But even if this Court decides to follow

the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Employment Division.
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (gmith), the
compelling state interest test must be used because Mrs. Smith's
case presents a "hybrid" situation under the Smith rule.
Moreover, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was passed
by Congress to overrule Smith, commands the application of the
compelling state interest test as well.

So no matter which of

these authorities this Court uses to decide this case, the
compelling state interest test supplies the proper method of
analysis.

5

Under the compelling state interest test, California does
not have a compelling interest in promoting the housing rights of
unmarried cohabiting couples which justifies the siobstantial
burden the FEHA places on Mrs. Smith's free exercise rights.

The

FEHC’s ruling imposes a severe burden on her free exercise of
religion by forcing her to perform an act which is prohibited by
her religious beliefs.

Her First Amendment free speech rights

are also violated by the FEHC's ruling, as she was compelled to
sign and display notices promoting views which are repugnant to
her religious convictions.
The state does not have an interest in preventing housing
discrimination against unmarried couples that is sufficiently
compelling to justify infringing on Mrs. Smith's free exercise.
The lack of a compelling interest is demonstrated by the
legislature's failure to extend equal rights to this group in
response to the numerous judicial decisions which have upheld
discrimination against unmarried couples.

The legislature did

not intend to require the same protections for unmarried couples
as those given to other classes, such as race and gender.

Thus,

the state's interest in enforcing the FEHA against Mrs. Smith is
superseded by her right to free expression.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT DOES NOT PROTECT
UNMARRIED COHABITING COUPLES FROM DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ON THE BASIS OF MARITAL STATUS.
California Government Code section 12955, also known as the

Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful:
(a) For the owner of any housing
accommodation to discriminate against any person
because of the . . . marital status . . . of that
person, [and] (d) For any person subject to the
provisions of Section 51 of the Civil Code, as that
section applies to housing accommodations, to
discriminate against any person on the basis of . . .
marital status, . .
or on any other basis prohibited
by that section.
A.

Prior Derisions By California Courts Of Appeal Are Not
Determinative Of Whether Unmarried Cohabiting Couples
Are Included In The Definition Of Marital Status.

The two prior California Court of Appeal cases which held
that unmarried cohabiting couples are included in the definition
of marital status are not controlling in this case.

First,

neither the Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission court,
138 Cal. App. 3d 232 (1982), nor the Atkisson v. Kern County
Hniisina Authority court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1976), specifically
addressed what the term "marital status" means, and an opinion
cannot be an authority for an issue which is not addressed in the
court's decision.
(1989) .

See People v. Harris. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1071

Further, the two cases were decided on the basis of

issues different from those present in Mrs. Smith's case.

The

Afkisson court held that a county housing authority's policy
which forbade low income, unmarried cohabiting couples from
living in public housing "automatically excludes all unmarried

7

cohabiting adults; a class of persons defined by their marital
status."

Atkisson. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 96.

However, at the time

Atkisson was decided, the FEHA did not include a marital status
provision, and the case was decided on federal constitutional
rights and "a

general policy statement

related to public housing

as expressed by the state of California."
added) .

lA^

at 99 (emphasis

Therefore, since Mrs. Smith's case comes at a time when

the FEHA does include a marital status provision, which remains
undefined as to what classes of persons marital status includes,
Atkisson is distinguishable and is not controlling.
Hess is also distinguishable and is thus not determinative
of the outcome in this case.

Hess dealt with a landlord's

practice of requiring both members of an unmarried couple to
financially qualify for housing, while only requiring one spouse
from a married couple to qualify.

Hess. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 235.

The court held that this distinction was unlawful marital status
discrimination which was not justified by a legitimate business
purpose.

Id. at 236.

This case is distinguishable because it

was the business practice of requiring unmarried couples to
separately qualify for housing which was being analyzed in this
case, and not the issue of marital status itself.

Id.

In

addition, the court analogized to a federal credit act, and not
the FEHA, in deciding that the landlord's act of requiring
unmarried couples to separately qualify was an unlawful act of
discrimination.

Id.

Because Atkisson and Hess are not

controlling, this Court is free to hold that unmarried cohabitin'
couples are not protected by the FEHA's provision which forbids
discrimination on the basis of marital status.

8

j

B.

The Legislature Did Not Intend The Fair Employment Anq
HovisinQ Act To Protect Unmarried Cohabiting Coupigs.

To determine whether the Fair Employment and Housing Act
protects unmarried cohabiting couples from housing
discrimination, the legislative intent behind the Act must be
analyzed.

People v- Overstreet. 42 Cal. 3d 891, 895 (1986).

In so doing, the first step is to give plain meaning to the words
of the FEHA.

People v. Craf^. 41 Cal. 3d 554, 559-60 (1986).

If the language provides a clear answer, statutory construction
is unnecessary.
(1987) .

People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007-08

But if the language is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation, this Court must look to additional
sources for guidance, such as the legislative history of the Act
and contemporaneous administrative construction of the Act.
The term "marital status" is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.

It can either be construed narrowly

to classify people as either married or single, or construed
broadly to classify people as either married or unmarried,
whether they live alone or cohabit with another.

Thus, this

Court must look to the additional sources cited in Woodhead. 43
Cal. 3d at 1007-08, to determine whether unmarried cohabiting
couples are protected by the FEHA,
The history of the FEHA's development suggests that the
legislature was most concerned with classes of people other than
unmarried cohabiting couples.

For example, in a letter to

then-Governor Edmund Brown, the Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee and Housing and Urban Affairs stated that the need for
the FEHA was based on the fact that "[s] ingle women (and single
men) experience discrimination because of landlord stereotypes of

9

the nuclear family and the misconduct and financial
irresponsibility of single persons,
children

divorcees and

widows with

experience discrimination that would not be experienced

by single fathers with children."

(C.T. 50.)

(emphasis added)

Nowhere in the letter are unmarried cohabiting couples mentioned.
Thus, divorced, widowed, and single women with children, and not
unmarried cohabiting couples, are those whom the drafters of the
FEHA intended to protect.
Moreover, the opposition to the FEHA also supports the
conclusion that the Act was not intended to protect unmarried
cohabiting couples.

The California Association of Realtors, who

opposed the FEHA, stated that their concern with
anti-discrimination laws regarded "singles apartments, communes,
and homosexual liaisons," and the "creat[ion]

[of] a state

mechanism to prohibit selection of tenants -- even in the
interest of other tenants of the same project-- on the basis of
certain life styles."

(C.T. 46.)

The Association noted that

this would have a negative effect in instances where screening
can prevent "admission of those tenants .
precipitate vacancies of .

.

.

.

[which] would

. units occupied by families with

small children who might not wish those children exposed to those
life styles."

(C.T. 47.)

Thus, the fact that unmarried

cohabiting couples were not one of the groups the Realtors'
Association was worried about not being able to pre-screen
strongly suggests that such couples were not intended to be
protected by the legislators who wrote the FEHA.
Although the legislature made only minor changes (which did
not provide any greater guidance as to the meaning of "marital

10

status") to the FEHA after Atkisson. this does not amount to
legislative agreement with the Atkisson decision.

In ^arrig

f;*apital Rrowth Investors XIV. 52 Cal, 3d 1142, 1156 (1991), this
Court stated that "something more than mere silence is required
before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of implied
legislation."

Thus, the legislature's failure to respond in this

case should not be determinative of this issue.

Rather, since

"legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean, " the
legislature's apparent intent to exclude unmarried cohabiting
couples from the FEHA's protection should outweigh their lack of
response to Atkisson and Hess.

Tygy

Indyg • lU

orrupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d 379,
391 (1986).
II.

IF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT PROTECTS UNMARRIED
COHABITING COUPLES FROM HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, THEN MRS.
SMITH'S FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER THE
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST.
A.

Independent State Constitutional Grounds Suppprt The
TTrp Of The Compelling State Interest Test And Provide A
Basis For Exempting Mrs. Smith From The Fair Employment
And Housing Act.

California Mav Interpret Its Constitution Mqre
Broadly Than The United States Supreme
Interprets The Federal Constitution,.
This Court need look no further than our state constitution
1

.

to find a basis for exempting Mrs. Smith from California
Government Code section 12955.

In City of Mescruit^

—Aladdin's

castle. Inc.. 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that "a state court is entirely free to read its own
state's constitution more broadly than this Court reads the

11

Federal Constitution, "

reasoning that state courts are in a

better position to recognize the subtle differences in state law
which would provide for a broader interpretation of state rights.
Accordingly, the Court has held that states have the sovereign
right to "adopt in [their] own constitution[s] individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by [their] federal
counterpart."
(1980).

Prunevard Shopping Ctr. v._Robing, 447 U.S. 74, 8l

Furthermore, if a state supreme court relies exclusively

and independently on its own constitution to provide greater
protection of a given right than the federal constitution, that
decision is final and is immune from review by any federal court.
See Michigan v, Lnno. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Hgrk_v_
Pitcairn. 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court

has granted this Court the authority to decide this case solely
on the basis of the California Constitution.
This Court has indicated that it concurs with the U.S.
Supreme Court's assertion that state constitutions may be
interpreted more broadly than the federal constitution.

For

example, in People v. Brisendine. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-51 (1975),
this Court stated that "the California Constitution is, and has
always been, a doctrine of independent force," and that states
are "independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of
their citizens."

Another example is found in Sands v. Morgnoo

Unified School District. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 883 (1991), where this
Court held that "although federal cases may supply guidance for
interpreting [the religion clause of the California
Constitution], California courts must independently determine its
scope."

For this proposition, this Court cited a Court of Appeal

12

case which recognized that "California courts alone determine the
rights guaranteed by the California Constitution so long as those
rights extend equal or greater protection to those guaranteed by
the federal constitution under totally similar provisions of the
Bill of Rights."

Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist.i 193

Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1017 (1987).
The support for this proposition can be traced back to
nah-rieni v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89 (1938), where this
Court originally asserted that state courts are not bound by an
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision in
interpreting a similar state constitutional provision.

Moreover,

this Court stated in Sands that "as the Supreme Court of
California, we are the

final arbiters of the

constitutional provisions."

meaning of state

Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 883 (emphasis

added); see also Raven v. Deukmeiian. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 354 (1990).
Thus, this Court's own precedent supports its ability to
interpret the California free exercise clause more broadly than
its federal counterpart.
2.
The California Constitution's Free Exercise Clause
Is Broader Than Its Federal Counterpart,^
Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution states
in relevant part:

"The free exercise and enjoyment of religion

without discrimination or preference are guaranteed.

This

liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State.

The

Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .

.

.

."

The First Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
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thereof. •’
California precedent supports the fact that the religious
freedoms guaranteed by the California Constitution are broader
than those granted by the federal constitution.

In g^briglli v.

Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d at 89, this Court noted that "our state
constitution contains an express guaranty of freedom of religion
[while]

[t]he federal constitution does not contain a

similar express provision .

.

.

."

Further, in gands« 53 Cal. 3d

at 882-83, this Court agreed with the California Attorney
General's analysis of the free exercise clause, which concluded
that

[i]t would be difficult to imagine a more sweeping

statement of the principle of government impartiality in the
field of religion,

25 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 316, 319 (1955) , and

noted that California courts have interpreted the state provision
as being more protective of the principle of separation of church
and state than the federal counterpart.

Thus, this Court's

previous decisions support the conclusion that Article I, section
4 of the California Constitution is broader than its federal
counterpart.
The legislative history of California's free exercise clause
also shows that the drafters intended it to be broader than the
corresponding clause found in the federal constitution.

As

originally adopted. Article I, section 4 provided that "[t]he
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in
this State."

However, in 1879 the Constitutional Convention

strengthened the language of this clause by replacing the word
"allowed" with "guaranteed."

In explaining this change,
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delegate O’Sullivan stated:
I propose this amendment, because it is quite evident
that the word "allowed" conveys the idea that the right
to disallow or deny exists. Now, sir, I deny that any
Government or any power on earth has a right to grant
or deny freedom of religious belief .... Our
Government, being republican, should guarantee full
liberty to the citizen in his actions.
"Guarantee,"
therefore, is the proper word .... 3 Debates and
Proceedings, Cal. Const. Convention 1878-79, p. 1171.
Thus, the importance placed on the word "guarantee" supports the
proposition that the framers intended the clause to provide the
strongest and most absolute guarantee of religious freedom
possible, and is thus broader than the federal free exercise
clause.
California Precedent Supports Independent Rgli^nge
On The State Constitution And Application Qf Thg
Cnmpellina State Interest Test In Deciding Free
Exercise Claims.
Because this Court has decided two previous cases at least
3

.

in part on independent state grounds, the Court may rest its
decision in our case squarely on Article I, section 4 of the
California Constitution.

In Molko v. Holy Spirit Agg'n, 46 Cal.

3d 1092, 1119 (1988), this Court held that "neither the federal
nor state Constitution" barred plaintiffs from bringing
traditional fraud actions against the Unification Church in a
case where its members were accused of inducing plaintiffs, by
misrepresenting and concealing the Church's identity, into a
setting where they were unknowingly subjected to "coercive
persuasion."

It is clear that this Court rested its decision at

least partly on state constitutional grounds because it held that
the state constitution did not bar the tort claims, and that an
"applicable principle" in this case is that "California
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guarantees free exercise and disestablishment in the state
constitution."

Molko. 46 Cal. 3d at 1112.

Then, only one month

after the decision in Molko. this Court again considered
California's free exercise clause in concluding that "the First
Amendment and it California equivalent" did not bar criminal
prosecution of a mother who sought to use free exercise as a
defense when her child died of meningitis after receiving prayer
treatment instead of medical attention.

WalKSP

of Sacramento Countv. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 141 (1988).

Ct_t_
Thus, this

Court has clearly laid the groundwork for deciding Mrs. Smith's
case on the basis of independent state constitutional grounds
alone.
Moreover, this Court has specifically adopted and employed
the compelling state interest analysis as a matter of state
constitutional law.

In Molko. this Court specifically based its

decision on state grounds, and reiterated its long-held approach
to the analysis of free exercise claims:
Government action burdening religious conduct is
subject to a balancing test, in which the importance of
a state's interest is weighted against the severity of
the burden imposed on religion. The greater the burden
imposed on religion, the more compelling must be the
government interest at stake. A government action
that passes the balancing test must also meet the
further requirements that (1) no action imposing a
lesser burden on religion would satisfy the
government's interest and (2) the action does not
discriminate between religions, or between
religion and nonreligion. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1113.
Then, only one month after the decision in Molko, this Court
again used the compelling state interest test in deciding state
free exercise claims.

Walker. 47 Cal. 3d at 139-41.
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Further,

because this Court has affirmed its belief that "the right to
free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our
history," People v. Woodv. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727 (1964), both
public policy and precedent support the use of the compelling
state interest test in analyzing free exercise claims under the
state constitution.
B.
Mrs. Smith's Case Presents A "Hybrid" Situation Undgg
The Federal Constitution And Thus Must Be Analyzed
Under The Compelling State Interest Test^
1.

The United States Supreme Court's Ruling In
Employment Division. Department Of Human R^spurces
nf Oregon v. Smith Did Not Eliminate The
rompellina State Interest Test As A Mode 01
Analysis In All Cases Of Free Exercise
Infringement.
Even if this Court decides to apply the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division. Department of Human Resources .of
Oregon

v. Smith (Smith) . 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the compelling

state interest test still must be used to analyze Mrs. Smith's
claims.

Up until the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Smith,

free exercise claims were subject to the same compelling state
interest test that this Court used in Molko and Walker:
government regulation is not unconstitutional either (1) if it
does not infringe on constitutional free exercise rights or (2)
if it does infringe on these rights, but the burden on free
exercise rights is justified by a compelling state interest in
regulating a matter which is within the state’s power to
regulate.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).

The

party claiming free exercise infringement must show "the coercive
effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the
practice of his religion."

Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
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U.S. 203, 223 (1963).

If the party indeed establishes that his

free exercise rights have been infringed, the infringement is
subjected to strict scrutiny.

Hobbie

vl._ILne^nplpyrnent;

Comm’n of Fla. . 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).

Appeals

It then becomes the

state's burden to show that a compelling state interest justifies
the infringement, and that the enactment provides the least
restrictive means of reaching the state's end.

ghgrbprt« 374

U.S. at 406-09.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in gmith, however,
purported to alter the method of analysis to be applied to most
free exercise claims.

In Smith. 494 U.S. at 874, two drug

rehabilitation counselors were fired from their jobs because they
ingested peyote^ for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their
Native American Church.

When they applied to the Employment

Division for unemployment compensation, they were deemed
ineligible to receive the benefits because they were discharged
for "work-related 'misconduct.'"

Id.

The Oregon Supreme Court

ruled that they could not be denied benefits based on conduct
that is protected by the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution,

Id.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision, and in so
doing, set forth a new test for most claims of free exercise
infringement.

The Court held that "if prohibiting the exercise

of religion ... is not the object of the [law] but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."
494 U.S. at 878.

'

Smith.

Further, the Court stated that it had never

Peyote is a controlled substance under Oregon state law.
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held that "an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance" with such a law.

Smith/ 494 U.S. at 878-79.

The

Court held that the First Amendment prohibits laws only if the
state seeks "to ban acts . .

. only when they are engaged in for

religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that
they display, " and that religious motivation does not place
conduct "beyond the reach of a

criminal law

that is not

specifically directed at the religious practice."
(emphasis added) .

at 877-78

Thus, the general test to be applied to most

free exercise infringement claims was dramatically altered.
However, the Court did retain the compelling state interest
test for "hybrid situations," which are defined as cases which
involve "not [only] the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press."
494 U.S. at 881.

Smitli,

Although the Court found that the Smith case

did not present a "hybrid" situation, it did cite examples of
such cases, which involved free exercise claims that affected
other constitutional protections, ranging from freedom of speech
to parental rights.

Among the examples the Court listed

were "cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively
upon free speech grounds [that] also involved freedom of
religion."

Id. at 882.

Therefore, in cases where a law

infringes upon free speech rights as well as free exercise
rights, the method of analysis remains the compelling state
interest test.

Id. at 881, 884-85.
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2.

The Facts Tn Mrs. Smith's Case Prgggnt A "Hybrid”
.q-iMiaf-inn Unf^^r The United States Supreme Court's
Analysis- And Thus The Compelling State Interest
Test Must- Be Applied To Her Free Exercise
Infringement Claims^
The facts of our case present a "hybrid" situation whose
outcome must be determined under the compelling state interest
test because, although the FEHA is admittedly a law which is
neutral on its face, Mrs. Smith's free speech and free exercise
rights are implicated.

Her free speech rights were violated by

the FEHC's requirement that, as a penalty for violating the FEHA,
she was compelled to sign and post notices in her rental
properties for ninety days stating that she had been found guilty
of housing discrimination on the basis of marital status.
Additionally, Mrs. Smith was ordered to sign and permanently post
those portions of the FEHA which define the rules which prohibit
marital status discrimination in housing.

Simply put, not only

is Mrs. Smith being forced to commit a sin, according to her
religious beliefs, by being forced to rent to unmarried
cohabiting couples in the future, but she is also being forced to
speak by signing and posting notices on her own property which
proclaim rules and values which are repugnant to her religious
beliefs.

Thus, the facts of this case present the type of

"hybrid" situation outlined by the Court in Smith, and the
compelling state interest test must be applied.
3.
United States Supreme Court Precedent Supports The
Conclusion That Mrs,. Smith's Case .Presents A
"Hybrid" Situation Under The United States Supreme
Court's Analysis And Is Thus Subject To The
Compelling State Interest Test.
Precedent which the U.S. Supreme Court cited as exemplary of
"hybrid" situations supports the finding that the facts in Mrs.
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Smith's case also present a "hybrid" situation, requiring this
Court to apply a compelling state interest analysis.

In Woglgy

430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), a husband and wife, both
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith, sought injunctive
relief to prohibit the state of New Hampshire from forcing them
to "advertis[e] a slogan which [they found] morally, ethically,
religiously and politically abhorrent."

The slogan in question

was the state motto, "Live Free or Die," which appears on state
vehicle license plates.

14^ at 706.

The Court found that the

state statute compelling this motto to appear on their license
plates "in effect require[d] that appellees use their private
property as a 'mobile billboard- for the State's ideological
message - or suffer a penalty."

at 715.

Further, the Court

stated that in enacting a law "which forces an individual, as
part of his daily life .

.

. to be an instrument for fostering

public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable," the state "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control."

I4i-

The

Court applied the compelling state interest test and found that
the state's interest was not compelling enough to justify the
substantial infringement on the parties' personal liberties.

Id^

at 716.
The facts in Mrs. Smith's case are substantially similar to
those in Woolev to classify it as a "hybrid" case involving the
same rights -- free exercise and free speech.

It is clear that

Mrs. Smith's free exercise rights are involved, as were the
parties' in Wooley. because if forced to abide by the FEHA, she
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will be forced to engage in conduct and promote beliefs contrary
to her religious principles.

But Wpolgy supports Mrs. Smith's

contention that her free speech rights are implicated as well, as
this right "includes both the right to speak freely and the right
to refrain from speaking at all ...

- The right to speak and

the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components
of the broader concept of -individual freedom of mind.'"

Woplgy,

430 U.S. at 714 (citing Rnard of EdUC. v. Barn$tte> 319 U.S. 624,
633-34, 637 (1942)).

Therefore, the fact that Mrs, Smith is

forced to make, rather than prevented from making, statements
which contradict her religious beliefs
works no less an infringement of [her] constitutional
rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the
notion that an individual should be free to believe as
he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State. Abood v.—Detrpit—Bd-s—Sf
Educ.. 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
Accordingly, the FEHC’s order forces Mrs. Smith "to be an
instrument for fostering public adherence," as New Hampshire's
state law in Woolev did, to a rule which she finds morally and
religiously unacceptable.

Thus, her free exercise and free

speech rights are implicated and present a "hybrid," and the
Commission needs a compelling state interest and must use the
least restrictive means possible when infringing on her rights.
C,

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Commands The Use
Of The Compelling State Interest Test In Analyzing Mrs.
Smith's Free Exercise Infringement Claims.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C.A,
§ 2000bb, which was signed into law on November 16, 1993 by
President Bill Clinton, compels this Court to decide Mrs. Smith's
free exercise claims by applying the compelling state interest
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test.

Congress reasoned that the constitution's framers

"recognizted] free exercise of religion as an unalienable right,

It

and hence "governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification."
(a)(1) and (a)(3).

42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb

Further, since "laws 'neutral' toward

religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended
to interfere with religious exercise," the stated purpose of the
RFRA is "to restore the compelling state interest test as set
forth in fiherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wigcpnsin v.
Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972)," and to "turn the clock back to the
day before Smith was decided."

Id. at (a) (2) and (b) (1) and H.R.

Rep. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., Judiciary Comm., p. 15.

The

House Judicial Committee recognized that the compelling state
interest test, for many years and with rare exception, had been
used to examine free exercise claims, and that the Smith decision
represented "an abrupt, unexpected rejection of long-standing
Supreme Court precedent."

Id. at 3.

At the signing ceremony for

the RFRA, President Bill Clinton stated that the Act
"reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of
all faiths in the exercise of their religion in a way that I am
convinced is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders
of this nation than the Supreme Court decision."

President Bill

Clinton, Remarks at the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Signing
Ceremony. Federal News Service, Nov. 16, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.

Thus, according to both the

legislative and the executive branches of the federal government,
the Smith decision is overruled by the RFRA, and therefore the
FEHA must be subjected to the strict scrutiny demanded by the
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compelling state interest test.
III. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST WHICH
JUSTIFIES THE SUBSTANTIAL INFRINGEMENT ON MRS, SMITH'S
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION FOUR OF THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION.

A. Th-ifi rniirt

Always Construed The Compelling State
TntPrest Test Narrowly:^
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have
construed the compelling state interest test narrowly.

In Ypdet,

406 U.S. at 215, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to free exercise of religion."

In

Yoder, the Court held that even a state's interest in universal
compulsory education was not sufficiently compelling to override
an individual's freedom of religion.

Id. at 221-22.

Thus, this

Court should construe the compelling interest test narrowly and
find that the state's interest in ending housing discrimination
against unmarried couples is not sufficiently compelling to meet
this standard.
A state may abridge religious practices only upon a showing
that some compelling state interest outweighs the persons
interest in religious freedom.

Woody. 61 Cal. 2d at 722-25.

A

burden on an individual's exercise of religious freedom is only
permitted when (1) the state's interest is overriding,

(2) the

burden is essential, United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252, 257
(1982), and (3) the state's interest cannot be achieved by
alternative, less restrictive means.

Thomas v. Review Bd..

Indus. Employment Sec. Div.. 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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A mere

showing of a rational relationship to a colorable state interest
will not suffice.

Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 406.

When applying the compelling state interest test in the
context of housing discrimination against unmarried couples,
courts have construed the scope of the compelling interest
narrowly.

See Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 398; STTllth y_.—F^ir

Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1008 (1994).

The

focus has been, and must be, whether there is a compelling
interest in ending housing discrimination against unmarried
couples, not housing discrimination in general.

AttQrngy Qen. v.

Desilets. 418 Mass. 316, 325-26, 636 N.E. 2d 233, 238 (1994).
Thus, this Court should also focus on marital status
discrimination rather than discrimination in general.
B.
Forcing Mrs. Smith To Rent Her Apartments Tq Unmarried
rohahitina Counles Imposes A Substantial Burden Qn Her
Free Exercise Of Religion,^
Mrs. Smith is entitled to a religious exemption from the
Fair Employment and Housing Act, which prohibits a landlord from
discriminating against any individual on the basis of marital
status.

The initial requirement for exemption from laws for

claimed exercise of religion is that the claimant has a sincerely
held religious belief with regard to the contested matter.
Thomas. 450 U.S. at 714-16; Yoder. 406 U.S. at 215-16.

Mrs.

Smith believes that sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that
it is a sin for her to rent her units to people who will engage
in non-marital sex on her property.

(C.T. 4.)

The sincerity of

her beliefs is undisputed.
The ruling of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
("FEHC"), which compelled Mrs. Smith to rent to unmarried
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cohabiting couples, infringed on her free exercise of religion.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a law forcing an individual
to choose between following the precepts of his or her religion
and forfeiting benefits is an unconstitutional burden on
religious freedom,

sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.

In our case, the

burden on Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs is the choice she was
required to make between adhering to her religious beliefs by
refusing to rent to an unmarried cohabiting couple and modifying
her behavior to comply with the FEHA and the FEHC's order.

Thus,

Mrs. Smith’s rights of free exercise have been substantially
burdened.
Forcing Mrs. Smith to post signs on her property summarizing
provisions of the FEHA also violates her First Amendment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life .

.

. to be an

instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
of view he finds unacceptable" invades an individual's First
Amendment rights.

Woolev. 430 U.S. at 715.

In WQQleY> the Court

held that a state law infringed upon First Amendment rights of an
individual by compelling him to display a license plate with a
motto to which he had religious objections.

Id^ at 715.

Similarly, Mrs. Smith was forced participate in the promotion of
concepts which are antithetical to her religious beliefs.

The

requirement that Mrs. Smith sign and post the FEHA regulations
was a severe burden on her religious freedom.
Even though the FEHA is a law of general applicability, it
is constitutionally invalid in this situation because the effect
of this statute is to prevent Mrs, Smith from observing her
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religious beliefs.

Where the effect of a law is to impede the

observance of an individual's religion, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden is indirect.
Braunfeld

v. Brown. 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).

"A regulation

which is neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).

W^lz v, T^x

Thus, forcing Mrs. Smith to

perform acts which are prohibited by her religious beliefs
severely burdens her religious freedom.
Even in a commercial context, the state must justify its
regulation limiting religious freedom by showing it is essential
to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.

Our case is

distinguishable from a true commercial case such as Jimmy
Rwaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378
(1990).

In Swaggart. the state's tax on a religious

organization's retail sale of religious materials was challenged.
Id. at 390.

The Court held that the tax did not infringe upon

the Swaggart Ministries' religious freedom because the payment of
sales tax did not violate any of the ministries' sincerely held
religious beliefs.

Id.

In contrast, compliance with the FEHA

does violate Mrs. Smith’s sincerely held religious beliefs.
Unlike the Swaggart Ministries, Mrs. Smith cannot simultaneously
comply with both her religious beliefs and the government
regulation.

Our case is thus distinguishable because unlike in

Swaggart, the burden on Mrs. Smith's religious freedom cannot be
characterized as incidental.
People do not lose freedom of religion when they engage in
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business activity.

In another case where the burden on religion

occurred in a cotnmercial context, L££, 455 U.S. at 257, the Court
found that because the payment of taxes violated the Amish
religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social
security system severely burdened their free exercise rights even
though it was in a commercial context.

However, the Court held

that the social security tax was constitutional as applied to
Lee, but only because it was justified by the overriding
governmental interest in maintaining a nationwide social security
system.

Id^ at 257.

In this case the infringement upon Mrs.

Smith's religious freedom is unconstitutional because the
government does not have an overriding interest in the housing
rights of unmarried cohabiting couples as it does in providing a
social security system.

Thus, neither Lee nor any other case

holds that a person loses the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion just because the conflict between religious
duty and a government regulation arises in a commercial context.
C.

There Is No Compelling State Interest In Preventing
Disorimination Against Unmarried Cohabiting Couples
In The Housing Context.

In this context, a compelling interest includes "[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests."
U.S. at 406.

Religious freedom is one of most highly valued

rights in our society.
115-17 (1943).
freedom,

Sherbert. 374

Murdock v, Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. 105,

In order to justify an infringement on religious

Mrs, Smith's exercise of her First Amendment rights

must create an immediate danger to a compelling interest the
state seeks to promote.

Barnette. 319 U.S. at 639.

California

does not have such a compelling interest in promoting housing
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rights of unmarried cohabiting couples.
The state does not have a compelling interest in the
eradication of marital status discrimination.

The state cannot

rely on the mere existence of the challenged law to defeat the
guarantee of the free exercise of religion.

A state must focus

on more than just a compelling general interest in eradicating
invidious discrimination.

This Court must focus on the

particular type of discrimination at issue in this case, and
where the state's interest in eradicating it lies in the
hierarchy of its policies which must be protected, even against
constitutional challenges.

When viewed in such a hierarchy,

marital status discrimination against an unmarried couple does
not rank. high.
California has, in effect, sanctioned and judicially
enforced discrimination against cohabiting couples in contexts
other than housing.

The legislature has extended many rights to

married couples which it has refused to extend to unmarried
couples.
V.

Elden v. Sheldon. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 274-79 (1988); Maryin

Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 674 (1976).

Courts have consistently

upheld actions discriminating against unmarried couples.
example, in

For

Elden. 46 Cal. 3d at 274-79, this Court held that an

unmarried person does not have a cause of action for loss of
consortium.

Further, in Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, this Court

held that unmarried couples do not have a right to spousal
support.

Finally, in People v. Delph. 94 Cal, App. 3d 411,

414-15 (1979) the court held that unmarried couples do not have
the marital communication privilege.

If there were a compelling

need to prevent discrimination against unmarried couples, the
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legislature would have extended equal rights to cohabiting
couples in response to these judicial decisions.
The legislature's failure to protect the rights of unmarried
cohcU^iting couples reflects the state's strong interest in
promoting marriage in order to provide "an institutional basis
for defining the fundamental relational rights and
responsibilities of persons in organized society."
Cal. 3d at 275.

E]^sn,
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Due to the state's strong interest in promoting

marriage, it is unlikely that the state has a compelling interest
to the contrary in promoting the rights of unmarried cohabiting
couples.

Therefore, there is no compelling state interest which

justifies the severe burden which has been placed on Mrs. Smith's
religious freedom.
Because there is not an equally compelling state interest in
protecting all classes from discrimination, some groups are
afforded less protection than others.

Cleburne v._Cl^hU^ne

Living Center. Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) .

The

legislature did not intend to require the same protections for
unmarried couples as those required to prevent discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, and other groups whose protection
warrants strict scrutiny.

Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co.. 133

Cal. App. 3d 890, 894 (1982).

Marital status does not involve a

suspect class, and has never been afforded heightened scrutiny.
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n. 874 P. 2d 274, 289
(Alaska 1994).

In fact, the legislature has allowed public and

private post-secondary institutions to provide accommodations
limited on the basis of marital status, Stats. 1975, ch. 1189,
pp. 2942-48, indicating that instances of discrimination based on
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marital status may be justified by a greater public benefit.
The law has acknowledged that marriage is still the
foundation of family life in this country, M^ryiii, 18 Cal. 3d at
684, and that the state has an interest in promoting the
responsibilities of marriage.

El den, 46 Cal. 3d at 274.

The

structure of society itself largely depends on the institution of
marriage.

In Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bpard; 34

Cal. 3d 1, 9 (1983), this Court emphasized:

"We reaffirm our

recognition of a strong public policy favoring marriage.

No

similar policy favors maintenance of non-marital relationships."
See also Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464,
470-71 (1982).

Since there is no public policy in favor of

promoting non-marital relationships, it cannot be said that the
state’s interest in protecting this class is "of the highest
order" or compelling enough to override one of the most
fundamental rights in our society, religious freedom.

Thus, the

state's interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of
marital status cannot meet the strict requirements set out by the
compelling state interest test.
If, despite the discrimination allowed by California against
unmarried cohabiting couples and the absence of any national
policy against such discrimination, this is considered a
"compelling" interest which is "paramount" and of "the highest
order," the compelling state interest test is deprived of its
meaning.

Such a broad reading of the compelling state interest

standard undermines the protections guaranteed in both the state
and federal constitutions and the protection Congress mandated in
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
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The state's legitimate interest in providing housing for
everyone is not endangered by exempting Mrs. Smith from the FEHA.
This interest is served in numerous other ways.

The FEHA is not

essential to this state's interest in housing, nor is it the
least restrictive means of promoting the state's interest.
Exempting Mrs. Smith from the FEHA will not prevent the state
from adequately providing housing except, in these particular
units owned by Mrs. Smith.

There is no state interest in

providing prospective tenants with these units as opposed to any
other decent housing unit.

Also, there is no evidence of a

housing shortage for unmarried cohabiting couples that would
create a compelling need to prevent discrimination against this
group in the housing context.

In addition, there is no danger of

"opening the flood gates" to further discrimination in housing
because:

1) this analysis applies only to unmarried couples, and

not to other protected classes of individuals; 2) there must be a
demonstrated sincere religious belief to justify exemption from
the FEHA; and 3) it is in the economic interest of landlords as a
class to have their rental units occupied, and thus there is an
incentive not to discriminate against potential renters.
Any right to housing free of discrimination against
unmarried cohabiting couples which may be granted by the FEHA is
superseded by the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.

The FEHC has failed to establish a compelling

governmental interest in preventing discrimination against
unmarried cohabiting couples.

Thus, Mrs. Smith's legitimate

claim of free exercise of religion constitutes a valid exemption
from the FEHA.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the California
Court of Appeal exempting Mrs. Smith from the Fair Employment and
Housing Act should be affirmed.
Dated: October 26, 1995

Respectfully Submitted,

Counsel for Respondent

